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ABSTRACT

During the past five decades, the US Navy has successfully
operated a number of nuclear thermal propulsion systems with the
characteristics similar to those required for long duration, nuclear
powered, space missions. If nuclear reactor's are to be utilized for
space propulsion, they will embody many characteristics such, as size,
mobility, environmental security, crew safety, and long-duration
been
already
have
which
capabilities
independent-operation
demonstrated by their Navy counterparts. The authors present a brief
overview of both Project ROVER, NASA's most extensive nuclear
propulsion program to date, which resulted in a total firing tine of
1,020 minutes at power levels above 1.0 megawatt, This is contrasted
with Navy operational nuclear reactor experience for significantly •
Technical
longer periods of time at high average power levels,
issues central to the operation of Navy nuclear reactors which arc
directly applicable to nuclear powered , manned, space missions are
The Navy ' s nearly perfect safety record, enviable
explored.
environmental record, as well as significant design, and operational
experience achieved during approximately 3 , 800 reactor-years of
experience and, corporate opinion both
its
operation make
authoritative and convincing in nuclear matters while providing a
data base of extreme value which should not be ignored in the
development of future space nuclear systems.
INTRODUCTION

The Navy Nuclear Program is an analogue for long!" duration«
nuclear powered, manned space missions for two predominant reasons.
The first is the tremendous comparability of goals; correlation of
data types; similarity of operation; and corresponding power levels
and temperatures. The second is the Navy's technical expertise in
nuclear safety, environmental, design and operation issues which
warrants consideration as a model when developing a space nuclear
rocket for long duration missions,
BACKGROUND

The US performed significant research in the area of nuclear
rocketry under a project known as ROVER front 1.955 to 1,973 [1].
During this time the country invested. $1,5 billion on the development
of a nuclear rocket engine known by the acronym NERVA (Nuclear Engine.
for Rpcket Vehicle Application) [2]. Nuclear rockets* desirability
Their operating temperatures are
stems from two factors.
characteristically high, andl they are true monopropellant engines.
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Both these items raise the specific impulse (Isp) of nuclear rocket
engines over their conventional bipropellant chemical rocket
counterparts. This occurs because the Isp of any rocket engine is
directly proportional to the square root of the chamber temperature
and inversely proportional to the average molecular weight of the
propellant [3].
Project ROVER met or exceeded all established goals and was able
to complete the design and manufacture of a prototype nuclear rocket
engine whose physical dimensions are comparable to current Navy
nuclear reactors. Interestingly, one of the designers is a current
designer of Navy nuclear reactors—Westinghouse.
The experience
amassed is shown in Fig. 1 [1]. The project was terminated in 1973
as the space program's priorities shifted.
At termination no
technical barriers existed to the development of a nuclear rocket;
nevertheless, nuclear propulsion for space applications disappeared
from the scene [4].
Navy nuclear power traces its beginnings to just prior to WWII.
Dr. George Pegram, a Columbia University physicist, and Dr. Enrico
Fermi, a nuclear physicist, submitted a plan for a "fission chamber"
which would generate steam for a submarine power plant. After WWII
and the successful completion of the Manhattan Project, the
destructive uses of this new form of energy were widely known and
appreciated, or perhaps feared is a better description. Many wished
to see the awesome capabilities of nuclear energy harnessed for the
generation of electricity and/or propulsion.
Inspired by Jules
Verne's vision in Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, on the 21st
of January in 1954, the Nautilus became the world's first nuclear
powered vessel [5].
In the intervening years the Navy has built ever more advanced
ships, submarines, and their concomitant reactors. Assuming a plant
efficiency of 20%, the shaft horsepowers of Navy nuclear ships
correlate with reactors capable of producing approximately 25 to 500
megawatts-thermal for extended periods of time. To date, the US Navy
operates 174 reactors on 144 ships [6], three land based prototypes
and a moored training ship [7].
The reactors have kept pace
technologically as evidenced by the solid core nuclear thermal
propulsion design Advanced Fleet Reactor which is currently
undergoing tests for ultimate installation in a Seawolf class
submarine.
THE CLAIM FOR A RELATIONSHIP; THE NAVY ANALOGUE

NASA recognizes the overwhelming advantages of nuclear
propulsion usage in space and believes that a "broad base of
government and industry support . . . [has been] developed" to
conduct such research.
Accordingly, NASA established the Nuclear
Propulsion Project Plan which calls for expanding "on the substantial
NERVA data base" [8]. In short, data and experience on solid core
nuclear thermal systems are being assembled to further nuclear
rocketry development. Notably, the considerable data and experience
garnered by the US Navy in the area of nuclear thermal propulsion
remains unmentioned.
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The NERVA data base contains information on 1,020 minutes of
reactor operation above the 1 MW level (see Fig. 1) , without an
actual flight test of an engine.
By contrast, the Navy has four
decades of experience with operational solid core nuclear thermal
systems. Its 180+ reactors make it the largest operator of nuclear
plants in the US; more importantly, the total operating time
accumulated is 3,800 reactor-years. More than 95% of this experience
encompasses mobile systems which traverse the globe under ever
changing and harsh environmental conditions while maintaining high
standards of safety and reliability. As a consequence, they are able
to dock in close contact with the general public and find acceptance
at 150 ports in 50 countries [6].
Furthermore, three land based
prototype sites—in Connecticut, New York, and Idaho—and a moored
training ship in Charleston, SC add daily to this experience.
Maintenance, overhaul, and sundry reactor servicing work is conducted
at two private and six government shipyards. Research occurs at two
Department of Energy laboratories. Two engineering and procurement
organizations are under the aegis of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program dealing with some 800 contractors. The Navy's system trains
approximately 2,400 enlisted (technical) and 250 officer (management)
personnel a year.
Finally, a disposal program exists which has
shipped 16 reactors to the Hanford, WA reservation with additional
units scheduled [6].
In addition to extensive experience, the Navy's Nuclear
Propulsion Program shares a similarity of goals with Project ROVER
and NASA's current Nuclear Propulsion Project Plan, goals which the
Navy has met and whose operational results have been documented and
utilized since the 1950s. Consider the first reactor design goal of
Project ROVER; namely, the maximization of core exit temperature. In
nuclear rocketry high exhaust temperatures are to increase the
specific impulse and thus raise the efficiency of the engine.
In
Navy designs a higher exit temperature results in a greater steam
temperature and thus a greater plant efficiency. The second goal was
an increase in the longevity of operation.
In rocketry, nuclear
engines will need to operate for many total hours over a period of
months, or even years.
In Navy systems, longevity is measured by
total operating times in the thousands of hours over a life cycle of
15 to 20 years. Such operational longevity has already been achieved
by a number of reactors currently in use. Moreover, current funded
research is attempting to stretch reactor lifetimes into the 20-30
year range, thus making reactor life span identical to the life span
of the ship for which it is intended. The third goal of the ROVER
reactor designers was to minimize hydrogen corrosion. In both space
and naval applications the concern is system integrity. The Navy has
minimized the hydrogen corrosion problem by proper materials
selection, chemistry control, and by setting specific operational
limits. Many of these methods have relevance to space based systems.
An additional goal is the prevention of fuel breakage due to
vibrational and thermal stress. In space reactors this is mainly to
ensure continued operation of the power source. The Navy's concerns
over such breakage are similar although much expanded as all of its
reactors operate within the biosphere for long periods of time in
close proximity to humans, including both crew personnel and the
general public. Crew safety from the added radiation exposure, due
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to fuel breakage, would be a limiting factor in the self-contained
environment of a submarine where the power source could not be shut
down without endangering the ship and/or the mission.
Also, the
environmental impact, subsequent political uproar, and ensuing
operational restrictions would be unacceptable. Thus the Navy has
adopted intense quality control from "cradle to grave" involving
meticulous material selection and manufacturing techniques to
minimize the occurrence of fuel breakage [6],
The similarity of the above reactor design objectives has
resulted in configurations not unlike one another. Both ROVER and
pressurized water reactor (PWR) cores function to transfer energy
from the uranium fuel to a working fluid which passes through the
core.
In the case of the ROVER open loop system this fluid is
expanded in a nozzle to extract energy. In a closed loop PWR system
the high temperature fluid transfers its energy to a separate
secondary fluid to create steam [9].
The overall objectives of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
as outlined before the House Armed Services Committee call for a
simple, conservative design with redundancy, self-regulation, and
ample safety margins [6]. Moreover, developmental goals currently
being investigated under Navy auspices, which will sound familiar to
those in the space nuclear rocketry field, include the following:
• to achieve longer life with greater plant reliability and
reduced plant size and weight
• to develop and qualify high integrity nuclear fuel
• to qualify various materials through irradiation testing
• to refine modeling techniques using expanded supercomputers
• to improve corrosion resistance.
The Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program's enormous experience and
similarity of goals with the Space Nuclear Propulsion Project Plan
proffers much to NASA since the data is on reactors of the type used
in nuclear rockets and the data base is extensive.
In acknowledging the need for high specific impulse engines for
future space flight, those at NASA considered three main types of
rockets: high performance chemical rockets that burn liquid hydrogen
and liquid oxygen, nuclear rockets (gaseous and solid), and various
fusion rocket concepts. They concluded the fusion concepts would not
be ready before 2020, well beyond Mars mission planner target dates.
Also, chemical propulsion systems require the use of aerobraking to
keep mission mass within acceptable limits, a technology in its
incipient stages though it has been used by Viking and will be used
by Galileo. Therefore, "solid and perhaps gas-core nuclear thermal
rockets offer some of the best prospects for short trip times on the
order of a year or less in the next two decades" [10].
Gas core
reactors will require advances in computational fluid dynamics (which
is admittedly occurring) but will be difficult to sell to Congress
and the general public since, no matter how efficient the design,
radioactive fuel and fission by-products will unavoidably appear in
the exhaust.
Consequently, the solid core nuclear thermal rocket
seems to provide the best overall approach and it is exactly this
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type of core the Navy has used from the inception of the nuclear
• ,
program.
From its earliest beginnings the Navy's nuclear program has
emphasized attention to detail in all facets of operation and has
demanded the data to support said details. Data which could be made
available to space reactor designers includes information on initial
core design, core fabrication techniques and their results after
extended usage (based on actual expended core examination), reactor
protection and analysis studies, maintenance requirements, equipment
reliability, chemistry controls, and the resultant corrosion over a
period of years, difficulties with control systems and operational
procedures, etc. This data is sent to NAVSEA 08, commonly known as
Naval Reactors (NR), via Quarterly Data Reports, Quality Assurance
and various
Alteration and Improvement programs,
documents,
maintenance reports. All of this copious information exists and is
This data would
archived in one form or another within the DOD.
provide insight to those involved in NASA's Nuclear Propulsion
Project Plan.
For the Navy nuclear program to claim a useful relationship with
spaceborne systems, it must share with such space systems the ability
to operate and survive long-duration independent-operation missions
which are the mainstay of proposed nuclear rocket engine
applications. The Navy nuclear submarine fleet has always existed
Indeed, this long-duration operational
for just such operations.
capability independent of the earth's atmosphere is both the strength
and the raison d'etre for today's US submarines.
The first nuclear submarine, the USS Nautilus, steamed for
69,138 miles in two years on a single core, thus beginning a long
series of proofs regarding the endurance of Navy nuclear systems
[11]. Today's reactors possess greater thermal output than earlier
versions and last up to 10 times as long. The Nautilus extended its
feats by traversing the north polar ice cap (using inertial guidance)
in 1958. The USS Skate went one better by surfacing at the pole in
1959. A year later, the USS Triton, independent of all logistical
support and the earth's atmosphere, circumnavigated the globe in 83
The Triton's limiting factor was the
days and 10 hours [12].
endurance of its crew along with its limited food storage, not its
nuclear power source.
Submarines today operate for months independent of all support,
including the atmosphere, if need be, with the nuclear reactor
producing power in the megawatt range continuously and in close
proximity to its human crew. This operation occurs in the depths of
the world's oceans as well as under the polar ice caps, areas
As a single
considered by many to be less well known than space.
example, a smaller percentage of the ocean bottom has been explored
by man than percentage of lunar surface area has been explored by the
Apollo astronauts. Maintenance to the reactor during these extended
periods of operation is nonexistent. In fact, overhaul of the entire
reactor plant system is required only every 7-10 years with the
reactor itself and immediate supporting equipment not requiring work
for the life of the core and/or the ship. In short, the endurance of
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Navy nuclear reactors and associated plants is without parallel,
as
an examination of the supporting documents will attest.
Finally, the power levels and temperatures are
between Navy reactors and those which will be utilized comparable
in space.
Admittedly, a terse look at the output and operating temperatures
of
the NERVA engines would not support such a claim.
However, it is
universally recognized nuclear engines will be exoatmospheric due
to
environmental concerns and their low thrust. The most likely use for
such engines involves taking the reactors critical only after they
are in space.
Such nuclear engines will either have lower total
power output than the NERVA engines or longer operating times,
either
of which would make them akin to Navy nuclear designs.
Operating temperatures of Navy reactors are well below those of
nuclear rockets; however, the temperatures considered
reactor
protection analysis, i.e., reactor accident studies, arefor
within the
operating range of such engines. Furthermore, these temperatures
are
used by Navy designers when determining fuel and cladding
configurations to prevent fuel breakage and thermal stress failures
over the life of the reactor.
Thus, such reactor
will
account for many of the difficulties faced by today's designs
designers of
nuclear rocket engines.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

The US space program has suffered four incidents involving
nuclear power [13]. The first incident was on April 21, 1964
a
launch vehicle was destroyed after failing to achieve orbit. when
This
accident released approximately 17,000 curies, increased
4% the
total atmospheric burden of plutonium, and tripled the by
worldwide
inventory of the Pu 238 isotope [14]. The second incident occurred
on May 16, 1965 when the US's only space reactor, the SNAP
10A,
experienced a voltage regulator failure.
The reactor was
subsequently boosted to a "Nuclear Safe Orbit" (NSO) to ensure
sufficient radioactive decay prior to reentry [13].
The third
incident was on May 18, 1968 due to a launch vehicle abort because
of
erratic rocket behavior shortly after lift-off from Vandenberg
Air
Force Base. The on board Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG)
sank off the California coast.
The fourth incident involved the
Apollo 13 mission as a result of an oxygen tank explosion
[15]. The
returning lunar module carrying the RTG reentered the atmosphere
122
km above the South Pacific Ocean and was never recovered. The common
motif for these space nuclear power incidents is the inability
predict reentry points thus making this energy source a environmentato
l
concern for the world.
Importantly, designers do not expect the
radioactive material to become part of the biosphere and handle
such
matters in terms of probabilities for reentry and failure
of the
nuclear components rather than designing with the assumption
the
material will someday return to Earth.
In the 1960s the US Navy lost two nuclear powered submarines,
the Thresher and the Scorpion. Neither resulted from a failure
of
the nuclear power source. A Naval Court of Inquiry attributed
loss of the 'USS Thresher to a seawater system failure, i.e.,the
a
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flooding casualty. Numerous engineering improvements were instituted
following this loss, none of which implied flaws in the reactor
design [16, 17]. The USS Scorpion was lost while traveling alone off
the coast of the Azores. An explosion of one of the ship's torpedoes
is the presumed cause [17]. Of significance, differentiating these
accidents from the above space accidents, no radioactivity was
released to the environment. In each case, once the wreckage site
was located, samples were taken of the water and bottom sediment to
check for radioactivity. None was found shortly after the accidents
and sampling occurred periodically (in 1977, 1983, and 1986 for
Thresher; 1979 and 1986 for Scorpion) to ensure the reactors' fuel
had remained intact [6],
It has in both cases and no increase in
radioactivity has been recorded in the vicinity of the accidents to
date.
To compare then, after launching 25 nuclear power sources into
space,
four failures have occurred, one which tripled the
radioactivity of an isotope in the atmosphere [2].
Contrast this
with 3,800 reactor-years of operation, 65,000,000+ miles steamed
without a reactor accident, and two failures which released no
radioactivity to the environment [18]. Additionally, the Navy always
designs with the understanding its nuclear plants will operate in the
biosphere and with an appreciation for simple, redundant, selfregulating systems which will maintain the Navy's perfect record of
safety [6],
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

The Navy's effectual environmental program would mitigate public
opposition such as occurred prior to the launch of Galileo [19].
Moreover, the Navy is active in the study of other failures,
including the Soviets', in order to continually improve the system
[20]. This system monitored the radiation exposure of 35,525 people
in 1990 without a single person exceeding legal limits; in fact no
one involved in the Navy's nuclear program has exceed the legal limit
since 1967 [21]. Table 1 displays the total personnel monitored by
year and the range of their doses [21]; note the lowering individual
exposures.
This lowering could be accomplished by increasing the
number of individuals available to perform the various tasks;
however, the total man-rem has also decreased over the years giving
credence to the effectiveness of the Navy's radiological control
programs and its ability to shield personnel from an operating
reactor. Figure 2 shows this explicitly [21]; as the number of ships
has grown, the total man-rem per year has shrunk.
Along with exposure to personnel, the Navy is successful in its
ability to minimize discharges of liquid wastes and lower the volume
of solid wastes.
The release of gamma radioactivity in liquids
discharged to all ports and harbors from approximately one hundred
forty Naval nuclear powered ships and supporting tenders, Naval
bases, and shipyards, was less than 0.002 curie in 1990 and has been
since 1971 [22].
Additionally, while the number of ships has
increased, the total radioactivity level discharged has remained
constant. The radioactivity released to the open sea (>12 miles from
shore) by Naval nuclear powered ships is less than 0.4 curies per
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year since 1975 [22]. In the solid wastes area the Navy has driven
down the volume while raising the number of units.
In laymen's terms, if one person were to drink the entire amount
of radioactivity discharged into any harbor in any of the last twenty
years, he would not exceed the annual radiation exposure permitted
for an individual worker by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
[22],
With regards to the open sea, the quantity of 0.4 curie
released to the open ocean represents an amount less than the
naturally occurring radioactivity in a cube of seawater approximately
100 yards on a side [22].
To place the overall picture in
perspective, if all 174 of the Navy's reactors were considered a
single reactor and placed on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's list
of civilian commercial power plants as ranked by the amount of
radiation legally released to the environment, the Navy would rank in
the bottom fifth [6].
Finally, and powerfully, the Navy in a report to Congress
proudly claimed "no member of the general public has received
measurable radiation exposure as a result of current operation of the
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program" [22]. Furthermore, it should be
noted the Navy's nuclear environmental safety record has been
verified via independent monitoring by the Environmental Protection
Agency and various states [22]. Additionally, the General Accounting
Office conducted a review of the environmental, health, and safety
practices of Navy programs under the control of the Department of
Energy in 1990,
The findings stated all such practices at Naval
Reactors
laboratories
and
sites
contained
"no
significant
deficiencies" [6].
DESIGN AND OPERATION

At a Space Transportation Propulsion Technology Symposium at
Pennsylvania State University in 1990 the key technical issues in
which experience was desired and technical prowess considered
requisite were identified as follows:
Quality Assurance, Testing
Strategy, Reliability Analysis, Structural, Vessels and Nozzles,
Pumps and Valves, Control Systems, Shielding, Hydraulics, and
Materials [23].
Likewise, a study for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission on human reliability decried the "lack of data" from
commercial nuclear power plants which made it difficult to determine
the experience levels required to minimize errors [24], The report
stated that even the copious Three Mile Island data was mainly useful
in determining only the maintenance procedures required to minimize
errors.
The Navy has significant experience in all the key issue
areas mentioned above. In the words of the current Director of Naval
Reactors, the Navy exercises strict control over materials and
manufacturing processes as well as extensive inspections throughout
to ensure high quality from initial manufacture to final disposal
[6]. The operation of Navy nuclear reactors is deliberately labor
intensive to guarantee maximum operability in wartime situations; as
a result, the'human reliability data is abundant, experience levels
are high, and nearly 40 years of refining procedures to minimize
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errors is potentially available for study.
Operation of nuclear power sources invariably requires the use
of shielding to protect personnel and equipment. The shielding of
personnel is difficult in space applications due to weight
constraints and activities such as docking, rendezvous, and Extra
Vehicular Activity. Shielding experience in the space program tends
the
to be centered on an understanding of the space environment andwith
protection of personnel from this environment [25]. Personnel
the experience to perform shielding and other space nuclear related
the
studies are scarce and not likely to become more abundant in[26].
future unless space nuclear engineering education is expanded
In summary, what's lacking is hands-on experience and data.
The Navy can provide both. Over the years Navy shielding has
is
protected tens of thousands of individuals. Furthermore, the Navy
proficient in the handling of radioactive wastes and can guide NASA
which
area
systems—an
disposal
waste
nuclear
in the design of space
Finally, until
has received little technical attention [27].
personnel are available in ample numbers with space nuclear
is a
experience
engineering
nuclear
Navy
engineering experience,
reasonable and logical substitute.
CONCLUSION
Space nuclear reactor designer's goals coincide with those of
Navy nuclear systems are
Navy nuclear reactor designers.
distinguished for their longevity; long life is requisite for space
Independent operation, isolated from a hostile
nuclear systems.
environment, is essential for both space and naval missions. Power
levels and temperatures are comparable between operational naval
reactors and proposed space reactors. Succinctly, the Naval Nuclear
Program is analogous to long duration, nuclear powered, manned space
missions. Moreover, the Navy possesses the design, operational, and
training experience; nuclear safety and environmental record; and
reputation in nuclear matters which would make it a valuable partner
with NASA in the development and deployment of space based nuclear
NASA has established a Nuclear Propulsion
propulsion systems.
Systems Office to develop a Nuclear Electric Propulsion or Nuclear
[28]. This project is a joint NASA/DOE/DOD
system
Propulsion
Thermal
effort and one would hope the Navy's information and experience in
nuclear matters will be utilized. While much of the data base is
classified and may require significant effort to obtain, the first
step is the realization of the relevance of the Navy Nuclear
Once this is
Program's information to space nuclear programs*
accomplished, the data can be analyzed for its usefulness; then, the
shape and extent of any resulting NASA/Navy team can be determined.
Ideally, the Navy and NASA will form a partnership whose purpose
shall be to take man to the heavens.
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16,749
17,997
16,229
20,716
22,403
21,197

3,069
3,261
3,271
3,160
2,142
2,217
2,642
2,812
2,234
1,528

0

21,845
23,608
27,622
27,645
30,106
31,465
33,960
34,699
34,786
35,166

1,494
1,415
1,660
1,B32
1,729
1,549
1,593
1,536
1,422
1,599

0
0

36,052
35,447

1,502
1,309

0
0
0
0

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0

0
0
0
0

0

o

•

200

0
0
0
0
0

0

0

6
25
50
60
100

10,805
12,852
18,982
21,565
24,696
27,718

1

0
2
1
1
0
0
0
3

Total

14
27
26
0
0
0

2

3
15
30
44
11
2
6

36
101
122
301
576
1,109

375
660
1,312
1,420
1,964
3,421
3,529
3,084
2,463
2,916

0

17

Total
Peraonnel
Monitor**!

2,711
4,957
7,095
9,442

Votet Data obtain** fro* eueiaariee rather than directly from original medical
record*. Total aan~re* was determined by adding actual expoaurei for amch
individual vonitored by each reporting cowumd during the year. Total nuiqber
monitored includaa riiitorft to each reporting cowoaad. It ie expected that
the l*ro« effort to co*pil« comparable »an-rea data from original medical
records would show differences no greater than five percent.
* Limit in the Ifaval Nuclear Propulsion Program waa changed to S ran per year
in 1967.
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REACTOR AND ENGINE SYSTEM
CUMULATIVE TEST TIME

Cumulative limc-At-powcr during rocket reactor
testing. Afttr DoWtf 51 Gabriel. "Nucltar Propulsion in ikt
Siat*it " 1972.

Figure 1
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